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Introduction  
Xi Jinping has set the ambition that China should be a global super power, leading in all 
different policy areas such as technology, military and global governance by 2050 (Pao, 2017).  
Both the European Union (EU) and the Dutch government published a policy memorandum 
outlining their policy response to the rise of China in 20191. The EU Commission published a 
Joint Communication that is called: ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’.2 The Dutch policy paper 
is called: ‘Netherlands – China: A New Balance’.3 These policy documents explain amongst 
others that China’s foreign policy has become more assertive and that this may impact the 
global order. They both argue that this respectively requires the EU and the Netherlands to 
rethink their approaches vis-à-vis China (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; European 
Commission, 2019). This paper critically analyses the Dutch national foreign policy in the 
context of the EU foreign policy by asking the question: How are economic and political 
interests balanced in the Dutch national foreign policy with regards to the rise of China and 
how does the context of EU foreign policy contribute to this? 
 It is argued that the Dutch government prioritizes economic interests and economic 
security matters. Moreover, the Dutch government stresses the importance of the protection of 
the international rules-based order. Political values, more specifically the promotion of 
universal human rights, are addressed in the policy response but they appear to be of smaller 
significance if compared to the 2013 Dutch China policy. Through the discourse analysis it 
becomes clear that there are public voices that strongly critique the policy choices made by the 
Dutch government: they mostly stress that more needs to be done in the field of human rights. 
However, these alternative voices seem to be of limited importance.  
 The importance of the context of the EU foreign policy stems from the fact that the EU 
is the Dutch government’s preferred level to act. Internal dynamics that may complicate this 
European cooperation however are marginalized or excluded from the discourse. This way EU 
cooperation comes across as more natural and less complicated.  
 This paper thus specifically addresses the academic debate about what drives foreign 
policy with respect to the rise of China. There are two main theoretical approaches in this 
debate: a rationalist approach and a constructivist approach. It should be noted that in 
                                                        
1 The rise of China refers to China’s increased presence on the international stage that has occurred under President 
Xi Jinping’s rule (Zeng, 2017, p. 1164). Not only is the Chinese economy still growing rapidly in 2019, initiatives 
such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) indicate that China is taking an active role on the world stage and is no 
longer keeping a low profile (Zeng, 2017). 
2 This will be referred to as ‘Joint Communication.’  
3 Original title: China-Nederland: Een nieuwe balans. 
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International Relations (IR) theory, the distinction is made between conventional 
constructivists and critical constructivists, the latter being a branch of IR theory to which 
poststructuralism belongs (Hopf, 1998; Palan, 2000). In this paper, the term ‘constructivism’ 
will refer to the conventional branch of constructivism. Rationalist papers tend to draw the 
conclusion that foreign policy formation in this case is solely driven by economic interests. 
Constructivist papers on the other hand argue that it is a delicate balance of economic and 
political interests and values, and that both play a role in the formation of foreign policy in 
response to the rise of China.  
There are three main problems with these approaches. The rationalist approach 
completely overlooks the internal dynamics of the EU member states in the research on their 
policy response. The constructivist approach widens this narrow rationalist research scope by 
including matters regarding internal state dynamics such as state identity. However, by 
maintaining a positivist approach to research constructivists are not able to analyze the margins 
of EU – China relations: what is not expressed explicitly but still plays a role in EU-China 
relations? Both approaches remain state centric, thereby overlooking other actors such as 
multinational corporations or EU institutions. As a consequence, it remains unclear how 
economic and political interests and values are balanced and whose interests and values are 
influencing this balance. Therefore, this paper approaches the debate from a third theoretical 
perspective: poststructuralism. Poststructuralism researches how meaning is produced through 
language, allowing to interpret the way the Netherlands approaches the rise of China and how 
this produced meaning influences which economic and political interests are prioritized, 
marginalized or excluded. This offers the possibility to take a different methodological and 
epistemological approach. By taking a discursive methodological approach rather than a 
process-tracing approach, this paper will include aspects that have been left out of the debate 
so far.  
This paper contributes empirically by analyzing the case of the Netherlands, a member 
state that has rarely been mentioned in this debate so far. Netherlands – China relations are an 
important topic on the agenda today as China is the  most important Asian trade partner of the 
Netherlands (Workman, 2019). With regards to the EU, the Dutch government states to be keen 
to collaborate on the area of foreign policy at the EU level. On the official website of the Dutch 
government it is stated that: “Speaking with a single voice gives the EU greater weight in the 
world. In principle this is also to the advantage of the Netherlands. Therefore, the Netherlands 
does what it can to maximize its influence, so that our interest make it onto the agenda” 
(Government, n.d.). In this paper, a closer look will be taken on how this maximization of 
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influence is expressed in national foreign policy vis-à-vis China and how the context of the EU 
contributes to the foreign policy formation in response to China.   
 
EU foreign policy  
There are two main reasons that indicate why it is necessary to study national foreign policy in 
the context of EU foreign policy. First of all, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU 
has gained strengthened competences in the field of foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty 
established amongst others the European External Action Service (EEAS) that started 
operations in late 2010 (Adyin-Duzgit, 2009, p. 138). The EEAS is run by the ‘High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,’ a position that was also created by the 
Treaty (Bressand, 2011, p. 59). It was established with the purpose of creating more continuity 
in the EU foreign policy ambitions, and thus moving away from the pre-Lisbon  rotating 
Presidency (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, p. 1316). The member states, through both the 
European Council and the High Representative, have the right to draft foreign policy proposals 
(Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, p. 1316). In the analysis of member states’ foreign policy, 
it is thus possible to come across matters that are referred or transferred to the EU level by the 
member states.   
Secondly, even if it is not through formal institutional changes, the concept of 
‘europeanization’ can also explain the relevance of EU foreign policy. In the field of foreign 
policy, Moumoutzis defines europeanization as “a process of incorporation of EU norms, 
practices and procedures into the domestic level” (Moumoutzis, 2011, p. 608). Member states 
cannot be forced to implement EU foreign policy at the national level, however they may 
voluntary choose to do so (Larsen, 2009, p. 548; Michalski, 2013, p. 886; Moumoutzis, 2011, 
p. 613). Larsen (2009, p. 548) therefore emphasizes that the study of national foreign policy 
should not overlook the context of the EU.   
This paper will proceed as follows: in the first chapter, the academic debate will be 
discussed in more detail. The rationalist and constructivist approaches are introduced and it is 
shown why these approaches are not sufficient. The first chapter will consequently introduce 
the poststructuralist lens and indicate the necessity of this third approach. It will then outline 
the methodological approach. The second chapter will provide a brief overview of historical 
developments in EU-China relations and NL-China relations to set out the context of the 
discourse. The third chapter will present the outcomes of the discourse analysis. 
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Theoretical and Methodological Framework    
The debate that this paper approaches is driven by the question: How are economic and political 
interests balanced in foreign policies of member states of the European Union in their response 
to the rise of China? There are two main theoretical approaches that can be identified in the 
debate. Firstly, a rationalist approach, which contains elements of both neorealism and 
neoliberalism. Secondly, a constructivist approach, which is argued to be the “middle ground” 
between rationalist theories on the one hand and reflectivist theories on the other hand (Adler, 
1997). 
Rationalist approaches adhere to a positivist view of science, which holds that science 
should be focused on systematic observations of the world (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 22). 
Positivists argue that knowledge stems from observations of the material world. By observing 
the material world, rules, structures and systems can be uncovered. This is similar to natural 
sciences research (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 22). Rationalists argue that all that is non-
observable cannot be relevant for international relations research (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 22). 
The main rationalist IR theories are neorealism and neoliberalism (Smith, 2013, p. 5).  
Constructivism also maintains a positivist approach to science, but brings the role of 
ideas and identities into the scope of the research (Adler, 1997, p. 323). According to 
constructivists, the study of international relations is comprised of “social facts”. These are 
social constructions such as “the state”, that only exist through actors who constructed those 
facts (Adler, 1997, p. 323). Adler (1997) demonstrates that constructivism thus challenges 
rationalist approaches not on a methodological and epistemological basis, but rather on an 
ontological basis.   
This paper will approach the debate from a third theoretical perspective: 
poststructuralism, a reflectivist approach. Reflectivism encompasses many different IR 
theories. Reflectivist approaches take a postpositivist approach to research: refusing the notion 
that social science can be conducted in a similar way as natural sciences are conducted (Whyte, 
2012, p. 4). Reflectivist international relations research focuses on “meanings, beliefs and 
language” (Kurki & Wight, 2013, p. 23). There are thus some ontological similarities between 
poststructuralism and constructivism. However, epistemologically and methodologically, the 
poststructuralist approach is different from both the rationalist and constructivist approach.  
Poststructuralism offers some advantages compared to rationalist and constructivist 
approaches. These will be briefly introduced but further elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
The main problem of the rationalist approach is that it overlooks internal dynamics of the state: 
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ignoring the role of state identities, cultural differences and history. In order to understand how 
EU-China relations develop and how foreign policy in response to China is shaped, it is 
necessary to include internal dynamics of the state into the analysis as well. Although the 
constructivist approach does include these elements, its positivist approach prevents 
constructivist scholars from researching the margins of EU-China relations. Poststructuralists 
hold that power relations influence what becomes common knowledge and whose interests and 
values become marginalized (Foucault, 1994, p. 119). Moreover, whereas rationalist 
approaches only focus on the state and constructivists focus on the state and the EU as a whole, 
the poststructuralist approach allows to include different units of analysis, as it researches how 
subjects in international relations come into being (Campbell, 2013, p. 277). Therefore, the 
influence of elite circles, multinational corporations or European Union institutions may more 
easily be included into the scope of the research.  
This chapter will discuss in turn the rationalist and the constructivist approaches to the 
debate. The last section of this chapter will examine what the poststructuralist approach entails 
and how it contributes to the debate.  
 
A rationalist starting point: Neorealism and Neoliberalism  
The main rationalist IR theories are neorealism and neoliberalism (Smith, 2013, p. 5). These 
two theories both regard the state as the main actor in international relations (Creswell & 
Kollmer, 2013). In addition, they both assume that states act rationally (Sterling-Folker, 2013, 
p. 115; Whyte, 2012, p. 3). Neorealists and neoliberals focus on the external dynamics of the 
state. Internal dynamics such as political systems within states are not important, as it is 
assumed that in the international system states all function in a similar way  (Ruggie, 1986, p. 
268; Sterling-Folker, 2013, p. 115).  
The idea that states are rational, unitary and that they all act in a similar way is strongly 
criticized by reflectivist IR scholars. Robert Cox, a well-known critical IR scholar, argues that 
by overlooking matters such as social forces or state structures, neorealism fails to explain 
change (Cox, 1986, p. 243). He argues that change can come from material conditions, but also 
from ideas or institutions. Research should therefore include more aspects than only material 
conditions (Cox, 1986, p. 243). Richard Ashley, an important poststructuralist IR scholar, sums 
this up by stating that neorealism overlooks the “four p’s: process, practice, power and politics”,  
thereby narrowing down the field of international relations research (Ashley, 1984, p. 258).  
Neorealist scholars deny this as  they argue that the international system is characterized 
by anarchy: in the international arena there is an absence of a higher authority, instead there is 
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“disorder and chaos” to be found (Waltz, 1979, p. 114). In this system of anarchy, it is the aim 
of the state to survive, as violence can occur at any moment in time (Waltz, 1979). For the 
survival of the state, states rely on self-help: they need to protect themselves from foreign 
threats in order to preserve their security. This is why it is argued that states all act in a similar 
way.  It is the principle of self-help that determines the international economic order (Ruggie, 
1986, p. 268). Power is defined in terms of material capabilities of the state, both in military 
and in economic terms (Ruggie, 1986, p. 93). Defensive realists like Waltz argue that states 
seek the amount of power that will ensure their survival (Steinsson, 2014). Offensive realist 
like Mearsheimer argue that states seek the maximization of power, in order to become the 
hegemon (Creswell & Kollmer, 2013, p. 57; Toft, 2005, p. 382). Internal dynamics of the state 
therefore do not matter to neorealists.  
Neoliberalist scholars agree that the international system is characterized by anarchy. 
However, contrary to neorealists, they hold that international cooperation is possible in an 
anarchical system (Sterling-Folker, 2013, p. 114). Chaos and disorder are not naturally found 
in a world under anarchy; difficulties can be overcome and cooperation among players in the 
international system can be achieved through the creation of international institutions (Sterling-
Folker, 2013, p. 115). Neoliberals also assume that states are unitary, but they base this is on a 
different argument. Keohane and Nye, two important neoliberal scholars, argue that economic 
interdependence comes with benefits and costs. State behavior can be predicted by the aim of 
the state to maximize the economic benefits and the costs of economic interdependence (He, 
2008, p. 494).  
In short: rationalist scholars pay little to no attention to internal dynamics of the state as 
it is assumed that states all act in a similar way in the international system of anarchy. 
Reflectivist scholars are very critical of that assumption, arguing that internal dynamics such as 
state identity, history and culture are important for the understanding of international relations.  
In the literature about member states’ responses to the rise of China, these reflectivist 
critiques on rationalist theories can be applied as well. Rationalist scholars note that member 
states of the European Union do not balance economic interests and political values. Instead it 
is argued that member states are mainly concerned with the preservation of their economic and 
material interests in their relations with China (Danner, 2019; Furst & Pleschova, 2010; 
Howorth, 2016;  Maher, 2016; Mattlin, 2012). Moreover, states are concerned with the 
preservation of the current international order, from which they benefit both in economic terms 
and security terms (Danner, 2019; Howorth, 2016; Mattlin, 2012). In line with neoliberal 
thinking, scholars pay specific attention to economic benefits that may be at risk when countries 
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express criticism towards China’s human rights situations. Rationalist research papers  exclude 
how China is perceived within states and how this influences their foreign policy approaches. 
Instead, the rationalist scholars referred to in this section do not go into depth about the political 
systems of the member states, or discuss other internal dynamics that may be of importance to 
understand how foreign policy vis-à-vis the rise of China is shaped.   
 Danner’s (2019) research on member states’ involvement with the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) clearly demonstrates the concern for economic gain and the 
maintenance of the international world order. He researched why EU member states have 
primarily gotten involved with the creation of the development bank initiated by China. He 
argues that member states become member,  not to change the normative character of the bank, 
but to ensure economic relations with China. In addition, member states aim to make sure the 
institutional character of the AIIB will be complementary to the international institutions 
already in place (Danner, 2019). Thus, becoming a member of the AIIB is not an act of 
balancing political values and economic interests. This focus on international institutions and 
economic interests is in line with a neoliberal lens. However, it remains unknown whether there 
were any internal obstacles to this decision and why some EU member states did become 
member of the bank and others did not. Historical contexts and perceived state identities may 
provide insight into why some member states become members and others do not.  
 Mattlin’s (2012) research further sustains the argument that it is not a question of 
seeking a balance between political values and economic interests. Mattlin develops the 
argument that the EU’s normative policy towards China has hurt the relationship more than it 
has offered (2012, p. 183). He suggests that EU foreign policy should be more “pragmatic” and 
“realistic” (Mattlin, 2012, p. 182). He further argues that EU member states have already let go 
of the ambition to push for human rights issues since 1995, only a few years after the Tianmen 
Square incident of 1989 (Mattlin, 2012, p. 188). Maher (2016) and Howorth (2016) further 
sustain this and respectively argue that the EU and its member states have pushed for trade 
deals regardless of human rights problems or have abandoned their human rights policies all 
together. Mattlin argues that the normative aspect is thus not relevant in EU and EU member 
states’ foreign policy formation. Instead, only the economic and material benefits count 
(Mattlin, 2012). However, by simply denying that member states are ambitious about their 
human rights policy, it remains unclear if this is because of public opinion that has changed or 
because of certain interests within the state that are prioritized and others that are marginalized. 
In other words, it remains unclear how the outcome is produced.   
s1533371 
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 In short, the rationalist accounts of member states’ foreign policy responses to the rise 
of China thus draw the conclusion that member states are not balancing political and economic 
or material interests. The rationalist accounts indicate that states act to maximize economic 
benefits from the relation with China and to ensure the status quo of the international order. 
However, as indicated, internal dynamics of the states are overlooked and as the consequent 
section will demonstrate, this results in a different portrayal of what drives foreign policy vis-
à-vis the rise of China.  
The following section will introduce the constructivist approach to the debate. It will 
demonstrate how other scholars conclude that states balance interests that follow from state 
identities.  
 
A middle ground approach: Constructivism   
Epistemologically and methodologically, constructivists agree with rationalist theories that the 
world is observable and exists ‘out there’ (Palan, 2000, 579). However, for constructivists the 
meaning of material reality depends on ideas and identities (Adler, 1997, p. 324; Palan, 2000, 
p. 579). Ontologically, they thus adhere to a different research agenda.  
Although constructivists accept that the international order can be characterized by 
anarchy, they argue that self-help does not logically follow from anarchy (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). 
In contrast to rationalist theories, constructivists regard the state as a social construct, not a 
unitary object (Fierke, 2013, p. 193). State identities thus matter in constructivist theory (Hopf, 
1998).  Constructivists argue that anarchy itself is not “chaotic,” but a world without identities 
would be chaotic, as state identities influence and help predict state behavior (Hopf, 1998, 174). 
The way states identify themselves and foreign states can predict how states will respond to 
foreign threats (Hopf, 1998, p. 174; Wendt, 1992). Moreover, state identities provide insight 
into state interests and preferences (Hopf, 1998, p. 175; Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Constructivists 
believe that identities can change over time, as identities are influenced by culture, history, 
politics and social contexts; as identities change, so do state interests. (Hopf, 1998, p. 175). 
 What is striking about this branch of constructivism is that it combines a positivist view 
on science with a social ontology. Therefore, constructivists argue that a researcher can observe 
social facts without changing the observed reality in the process of interpretation  (Panan, 2000, 
p. 579).  This is strongly criticized by reflectivist theories and specifically poststructuralists, 
who argue that the interpretation of the researcher cannot be separated from the observation of 
the researcher (Bieler & Morton, 2008, p. 106).  
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In the constructivist literature on EU member states’ responses to China, authors 
emphasize that states seek to balance political interests and material economic interests. These 
political and material interest follow from member states’ identities. However, in the literature 
it remains unclear what this balance looks like precisely, what alternative balances would have 
been possible had different ideas and identities become dominant. Moreover,  whose and which 
ideas have shaped state identities, the perceived state identity of China and thus the eventual 
response to China’s rise remains unclear as well. As a consequence, the margins of EU-China 
and member state – China relations are overlooked.   
Michalski (2013), demonstrates how state-identity, the historical development of the 
relations with China and political positions domestically and internationally contribute to the  
foreign policy agenda of Sweden and Denmark. She identifies these two EU member states as 
“ideological free traders,” indicating that promotion of free trade is part of these countries’ 
values and norms (Michalski, 2013, p. 885). The promotion of free trade and the protection of 
trade relations with China is therefore in the interest of these two states. However, the liberal 
and democratic characteristic of these states also result in the interest to defend human rights 
(Michalski, 2013). Moreover, the two states are also identified by their European Union 
membership. This research thus shows that the different characteristics of these two state 
identities result in different state interests that need to be carefully balanced. Denmark’s prime 
minister’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2009 resulted in a Chinese boycott of economic ties 
with Denmark. Michalski concludes that this has taught Denmark that it will need to balance 
its material interests and normative interests when it comes to their relation with China.  The 
question how these states identities were shaped and whose ideas and beliefs have shaped these 
three characteristics of Swedish and Danish identities remains.  
 Maier-Knapp (2016) approaches EU member states’ behavior in light of the EU as a 
whole. She looks into the relation between the EU and ASEAN and draws a similar conclusion: 
European leaders are carefully balancing economic interests and political values, in order to 
maintain good economic relations with an increasingly assertive China. She demonstrates this 
with the example of how member states go about the South Chinese Sea conflict (Maier-Knapp, 
2016, p. 419). Maier-Knapp argues that EU interference is unthinkable, especially as it would 
be “unjustifiable to the European public” (2016, p. 419). Chen (2016, p. 789) also focuses on 
internal dynamics, arguing for example that there is room for an EU-China partnership, but that 
both the EU and China first need to take care of internal problems. Constructivist research 
therefore goes one step further than rationalist approaches which remain concerned with the 
external dynamics of the state.  
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In short, the constructivist approach thus highlights that ideas, state identity and public 
concern may play a role in the formation of foreign policy. The balance that governments find 
in their policy response depends on material interests on the one hand and political interests on 
the other hand; interests that all follow from the identity of the state. Constructivists thus depict 
a different image of member states’ response to the rise of China in comparison to the previous 
rationalist papers. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what this balance looks likes and whose 
interests and values exactly have become the state interests and values on which the balance is 
based.  
The following section will introduce the theoretical perspective that this paper suggests 
to take. It will indicate how it can overcome the problems of the rationalist and constructivist 
approaches.  
 
A reflectivist contribution: Poststructuralism  
As mentioned in the introduction, in international relations theory, a distinction is drawn 
between conventional and critical constructivism (Hopf, 1998). Poststructuralism falls within 
the latter branch of theory (Palan, 2000, p. 586). Both branches depart from a research angle 
that understands the world as social (Hopf, 1998, p. 182). Therefore, intersubjective meanings, 
also known as commonly held beliefs or collective meanings, are regarded as necessary 
variables for understanding international relations (Hopf, 1998, p. 182; Wendt, 1992, p. 397). 
In addition, both theoretical approaches emphasize the importance of identity in international 
relations. However, as Hopf puts it, conventional constructivists use identities to explain social 
practices, whereas critical constructivists use identities to uncover how certain truths become 
dominant (Hopf, 1998, p. 184). This indicates an important difference in the theoretical aim of 
both branches.  
 Another important distinction to be made is the different methodological and 
epistemological character of poststructuralism. Poststructuralism adheres to a postpositivist 
view on science; rejecting the idea that language could be used as a neutral way to describe the 
reality observed (Milliken, 1999, p. 227). Rationalists tend to criticize this approach for not 
being “scientific” (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1984, p. 7). The poststructuralist response is that 
instead, they take a less formal and ahistorical approach to international relations which results 
in more room for philosophical research (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1984, p. 7; Milliken, 1999, p. 
230). Poststructuralist are thus critical of the ahistorical approach and aim for a different kind 
of research.   
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 At this point, it should be noted that the poststructuralist ambition is not to provide a 
“complete theory” (Campbell, 2013, p. 225). Instead, poststructuralists refer to 
poststructuralism as an “approach” rather than a theory (Campbell, 2013, p 225). This means 
that poststructuralism sets out a way of thinking instead of proposing one comprehensive vision 
of how the world works (Campbell, 2013, p. 225). This way of thinking is characterized to be 
critical. Critique is viewed as a way to define on which assumptions certain phenomena, 
situations, structures or systems have become ‘natural’ and consequently denaturalizing these 
assumptions (Campbell, 2013, p. 225).  Poststructuralism is thus focused on uncovering how 
certain phenomena have become ‘natural’ in international relations (Campbell, 2013, p. 227). 
Examples are questions of how the state became the main unit of analysis or how the 
international order became characterized by anarchy (Campbell, 2013, p. 277).  
Poststructuralism is an interpretive approach, which means it is argued that meaning is 
constituted through texts and that texts need to be assessed in their respective contexts 
(Milliken, 1999, p. 225). According to poststructuralists, language creates meaning, it shapes 
the world that is described (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1984). This is contrary to rationalist 
perceptions that take language as a neutral way to describe the world (Adler, 1997, p. 326). 
Poststructuralists maintain that language produces knowledge: it determines the way an object 
is talked about (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1984). Consequently, discourse regulates the way 
objects are talked about and have the power to rule out alternative ways of talking about that 
object (Foucault, 1994, p. 119). Through practice it becomes clear what meaning is given to 
particular objects and subjects (Doty, 1997, p. 377).  It is argued that truth is thus produced 
through discourses and does not exist outside the discourse (Foucault, 1994).  
 By analyzing discourses one can find out how meaning is constructed and how dominant 
modes of understanding have come to be the dominant mode of understanding (Der Derian & 
Shapiro, 1984, p. 13). Discourses are believed to try to fix these modes of understanding, while 
marginalizing and excluding alternative modes of understanding (Milliken, 1999, p. 230; Der 
Derian & Shapiro, 1984, p. 13). These processes of inclusion and exclusion are regarded as the 
result of power (Doty, 1997, p. 379). By analyzing discourses, a researcher can “denaturalize” 
these intersubjective understandings (Milliken, 1999, p. 236). Discourses do not only provide 
insight in which truths become dominant, they also provide insight in who is entitled to speak 
and who is not (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). Poststructuralist analysis can thus go one step further 
than constructivist research by analyzing whose truths are most important in the formation of 
foreign policy. Escobar (2011) elaborates that a discourse analysis thus offers the advantage 
that it reveals how knowledge is constituted and whose truths are most important in policy-
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making. In light of the topic of this paper, a poststructuralist discourse analysis will thus be 
helpful in establishing whose ideas, values or interests are important in the process of balancing 
economic and political interests and values in foreign policy formation.  
 
Methodology  
Intersubjective meanings and alternative meanings are uncovered through posing ‘how-
possible’ questions (Doty, 1993). By posing a ‘how-possible’ question, one can research how 
power works to establish commonly held beliefs (Doty, 1993, p. 299). Poststructuralists analyze 
the socially constructed context in which certain outcomes became possible (Doty, 1993, p. 
298). This analysis can include an array of variables, such as commonly held beliefs that were 
in place and the way certain objects and subjects were defined (Doty, 1993, p. 298-299).  
Whereas poststructuralists ask ‘how-possible’ questions, rationalist and conventional 
constructivist ask ‘why’ questions. Both the rationalist literature and the constructivist literature 
on the member states’ response to the rise of China conducted the research through the positivist 
method ‘process tracing.’ Process tracing is a method that focuses on causal mechanisms that 
can be revealed through narration (Ruback, 2010, p. 478). It offers within-case analysis and is 
therefore interesting when looking into the foreign policy formation of one state (Collier, 2011, 
p. 283). Establishing causal relations is what is generally strived for in the field of Global 
Political Economy (GPE) (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 22). Although poststructuralist analysis does not 
pose a ‘why-question’ and does not seek to establish one causal relation, a how-possible 
question can still uncover reasons that contribute to a certain phenomenon or development 
(Fierke, 2013, p. 198).  
In light of the delicate relationship between China and the EU and China and member 
states of the EU, it may well be that certain matters are left out of the discourse, or remain 
undiscussed. Therefore, an important advantage of a poststructuralist analysis is that it can 
include that what is being expressed explicitly in the discourse, but also those elements at the 
margins of the discourse, which can be uncovered through a critical analysis of the discourse.  
In short, a discourse analysis thus reveals how power produces knowledge; it indicates 
what dominant modes of understanding become the main understanding and reveals what 
alternative modes of understanding are marginalized or excluded (Foucault, 1994). In addition, 
a discourse analysis can tell whose truths are most important and who is entitled to speak 
(Escobar, 2011; Milliken, 1999). Although a discourse analysis does not establish a causal 
relation, it can still provide reasons for certain phenomena or developments (Fierke, 2013). An 
important advantage of the postpositivist poststructuralist analysis is that it allows to include 
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that which is excluded from the discourse into the analysis. Considering the topic of this paper, 
this is an important reason to take this poststructuralist approach.  
The method of discourse analysis is often critiqued by rationalist scholars who state that 
in discourse analysis “anything goes” (Aydin-Duzgit, 2009, p. 136; Milliken, 1999, p. 227). In 
response to this critique Milliken has set out a couple of commonly used methods to go about 
the analysis. This paper combines these methods in order to answer the research question. These 
are the  “juxtapositional method,’ the “subjugated knowledge method” and the “genealogical 
method” (Milliken, 1999, p. 243).  
 The “juxtapositional method” researches what positions are privileged in a text and how 
the meaning the text could have been different had there been different privileged. It then also 
assesses information is missing. The identification of binaries and dichotomies helps identify 
those positions (Milliken, 1999, p. 229).  This way it reveals how a certain truth is constructed 
and which truths are left out (Milliken, 1999, p. 243). The “subjugated knowledge method” 
builds on the juxtapositional method and studies the alternative truths in more depth. The 
“genealogical method” includes a study of the historical development of the discourse. Whereas 
it may look like the discourse is built on a constant development, this method can inform the 
researcher about changes that have occurred (Milliken, 1999, p. 243).  
To gain a proper understanding of how economic and political interests are balanced in 
the Dutch national foreign policy with regards to the rise of China and how the context of EU 
foreign policy contributes to this process of balancing, a combination of these methods will 
result in an analysis that indicate whether a certain idea or position is privileged, what interests 
and truths are not included, and whether this has been a trend historically or whether something 
has changed.  
 
Selected documents  
To establish the discourse, this paper complements the Dutch China policy memorandum and 
the Joint Communication with speeches and other related documents. This is because a 
discourse cannot be established based on just one document (Milliken, 1999, p. 233).   
The Dutch policy memorandum will be complemented by two speeches, one of the 
Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, and one of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stef Blok. 
This will provide some context on the government’s standpoints concerning China, the EU and 
the international arena more generally. The first speech that is selected is the so-called 
‘Churchill speech.’ Prime Minister Rutte gave this speech at the University of Zurich in 
February 2019. It is believed to be an important indicator for the Prime Minister’s vision on 
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Europe and the challenges the Netherlands and Europe face (Vandermeesch, 2019). The second 
speech  that is selected is the speech that the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave when the China 
policy memorandum was published. This speech helps understand which elements of the policy 
memorandum are emphasized. The parliamentary debate4 that followed the publication of the 
Dutch policy is also added to the discourse analysis, because it provides insights in what other 
matters play a role politically, and what opinions and thoughts are to be found in the public 
sphere. The Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV, meaning Council for International 
Matters) published an extensive advice for the Dutch government on how to approach China in 
the context of the European Union. This document provides a different perspective on the 
situation and is therefore also relevant. The 2013 Dutch China policy memorandum is also 
included, to provide some context on how China policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs have developed in recent years.  Finally, some media articles from all major Dutch  
newspapers are included as well to represent the Dutch media landscape. These articles 
appeared in the media at the time the policy document was made public and at the time it was 
debated in parliament a couple of months later.  It provides a sense of how the Dutch China 
policy was received in the Netherlands.  
A brief historical overview of NL-China and EU-China relations  
This section aims to set out the historical and political context of the discourse.  
 
Netherlands – China relations  
The Netherlands and China share a long diplomatic history. Already in the sixteenth century, 
the Dutch East-India Company (VOC),5  attempted to send people to China to do trade (Blussé, 
1989, p.  38). However, trade could only be established in the seventeenth century (Blussé, 
1989). In 1863 official diplomatic relations were established between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Chinese emperor (Blussé, 1989, p. 7). In 1943, the official relation was 
upgraded to the ambassador level. When the Democratic People’s Republic of China was 
                                                        
4 The parliament of the Netherlands consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The members of the 
House of Representatives are elected directly by the public. The senate is elected indirectly. The debate that is 
included in this discourse concerns the debate between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the House of 
Representatives (Tweede Kamer, n.d.). Words such as ‘parliament’ or ‘members of parliament’ refer to the House 
of Representatives.  
5 The Dutch East-India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) was a public company, established in 
1602. It ensured that Dutch East India companies would cooperate with each other instead of compete with each 
other. The public company thus made sure Holland would profit more from the overseas trade coming from East 
India (Robertson & Funnell, 2012, p. 349).  
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established in 1949, the Netherlands had to renegotiate its diplomatic relations with China 
(Fermont & Van der Putten, 2012, p. 41). This was complicated by the Netherlands’ support 
for Taiwanese membership of the United Nations (UN) (Fermont & Van der Putten, 2012 p. 
41). When China acceded to the UN in 1970 and Taiwan lost its UN membership, this issue 
was resolved and diplomatic relations were established at the highest level two years later 
(Fermont & Van der Putten, 2012 p. 41).  Trade has since been central to the relationship. It 
became easier for Dutch and Chinese businesses to do trade and after China became a member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Chinese investments to the Netherlands and Chinese 
business present in the Netherlands increased as well (Fermont & Van der Putten, 2012 p. 42). 
Trade missions to and from China have been numerous and continue to be so.  
In recent years, bilateral relations are known to have thrived. In 2014, Xi Jinping opened 
his visit to the European Union in the Netherlands, where both countries announced their 
ambition to establish “an open and pragmatic partnership for comprehensive cooperation” 
(Government, 2014). The consequent year King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands was 
received in China on state-visit. It was announced that China would be lending a pair of giant 
pandas to the Netherlands: an indicator that China values the Netherlands as an important 
partner (Chang & Pieke, 2016, p. 43; Government, 2015).  
In the Netherlands, despite this gesture, concern has grown with regards to relations 
with China. Matters such as human rights violations in China and technological concerns about 
providing  5G network access to Huawei have become more pressing (Waarlo, 2018).  The 
effectiveness of the noticeable bilateral human rights dialogue of China and the Netherlands 
has also been debated (Amnesty International, 2016; Chang & Pieke, 2016, p. 45). The 2019 
policy memorandum was requested in 2018 through a motion in parliament which outlined the 
necessity of a China strategy against the background of China gaining military, economic and 
political playing field internationally (Tweede Kamer, 2018).   
 
‘Netherlands-China: A New Balance’  
The new Dutch foreign policy memorandum on its relation with China was published a couple 
of months after the Joint Communication. The document is much more extensive than the Joint 
Communication. To illustrate, the Dutch policy paper is 90 pages long, whereas the Joint 
Communication counts eleven pages. The Dutch document discusses different areas in which 
the government is taking a new or more articulated approach towards China. The topics range 
from Trade, Peace & Security, to the International Rules-Based Order and Climate Change and 
encompass most aspects of the bilateral relation with China. Each chapter discusses a different 
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aspect. The chapters are concluded with a view on where the government should focus on and 
how they are going to achieve that (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b). 
 
EU – China relations  
Because of the institutional history of the European Union, EU-China relations do not go as far 
back as Netherlands – China relations or any bilateral relations between member states of the 
EU and China. Stumbaum (2009, p. 64) explains that EU-China relations were relatively 
irrelevant during the Cold War especially because of the EU’s and China’s alliances with the 
two different great powers. In 1989, China violently stopped student protests on Tianmen 
Square in Beijing (Stumbaum, 2009, p. 83). In response, European Union member states 
imposed an embargo on the export of arms (Farnell & Crookes, 2016, p. 88). The embargo is 
still in place today and it is known to  have caused friction within the EU as some member 
states such as Germany, France and former member the United Kingdom have been willing to 
lift it (Farnell & Crookes, 2016, p. 88; Stumbaum, 2009, p. 83). The Tianmen Square incident 
and the arms embargo resulted in a cooling down of EU-China relations (Stumbaum, 2009, p. 
64). However, this did not last for long as in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, EU-
China relations began to flourish (Stumbaum, 2009, p. 82). This became further 
institutionalized when in 2003 the EU and China announced their aspiration for a 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Farnell & Crookes, 2016, p. 226). The aim of this 
partnership was to go beyond trade and investment agreements and include other global topics 
such as security or climate change (Maher, 2016, p. 959). This was realized in 2013 (Farnell & 
Crookes, 2016, p. 226). Since then, it had not been  easy to establish this partnership. Trade 
disputes have been relatively common and the Chinese have been disappointed about the arms 
embargo that has remained in place (Farnell & Crookes, 2016, p. 88; Stumbaum, 2009, p. 82). 
A dispute about solar panels is said to be the largest trade dispute between China and the EU 
(Gaenssmantel, 2017, p. 108).6 This dispute was settled in 2013. 
Although the realization of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the settlement 
of the solar panel dispute indicate a turn in EU-China relations, the period after 2013 was not 
without challenges for EU-China relations. Some argue that the last few years have shown how 
the EU-China relationship was underprioritized by the EU that was busy with the conflict in 
                                                        
6 China was able to manufacture solar panels cheaper than EU manufacturers were. As a consequent, Chinese solar 
panels were installed in the EU and the European Union solar panels producers convinced the European 
Commission to impose a tariff on solar panels. (Chen, 2015; EIAS, 2015)   
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the Eastern neighborhood of Europe and the situation in Syria (Farnell  & Crookes, 2016, p. 
226). Moreover, in China perspectives have changed as well. Scholars researching Chinese 
perspectives on the European Union conclude that China’s high expectations of the European 
Union have faded (Chang & Pieke, 2016, p. 2). Reasons for this is for example that the Great 
Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 has shown China that the EU may not be the strong partner it 
was looking for to create a multipolar world order. Moreover, internal European affairs such as 
Brexit indicate to China that it is unlikely that the EU integration will proceed further and that 
the EU will be able to act as one actor internationally (Chang & Pieke, 2016). According to 
Chang and Pieke (2016)  this does not indicate that China has consequently become less willing 
to cooperate with the EU. Yet, due to the uncertainties, China focuses on its relations with both 
the EU as a whole and with member states separately (Chang & Pieke, 2016, p. 50). This reveals 
another reason why it is relevant to analyze the Dutch foreign policy in the context of the EU 
Joint Communication.  
Since 1989, EU member states have had different views on the relationship with China. 
Today more than even, it is evident that they  have different interests in respect with their 
relations vis-à-vis China. On March 23 of this year, Italy signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning the Belt and Road Initiative, which led to a debate both within the 
EU and a debate between the EU and the United States (Okano-Heijmans & Kamo, 2019). 
Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, has promised to visit China yearly basis. He has 
established the practice of bringing European partners along on these bilateral visits to show 
that the EU is still acting together (EIU, 2019; Even, 2019).  
 
‘EU-China – A Strategic Outlook’  
The Joint Communication was published by the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It was published on March 
12, 2019, in preparation for the EU-China summit that took place in April of that year (European 
Commission, 2019).  It builds on the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” that 
was published in 2013 (European Commission, 2019). The Joint Communication sets out ten 
actions that the Commission envisions as necessary to create a more “balanced, fair and 
mutually beneficial relation” (European Commission, 2019).  The ten actions range from 
strengthening cooperation on matters varying from human rights to fighting climate change or 
seeking involvement of China to resolve international conflicts. They also include economic 
actions to create a stronger and more reciprocal economic relation with China (European 
Commission, 2019).  
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The recent policy documents of the EU and the Netherlands indicate that relations with China 
is an important topic on the agenda today. The following section will critically analyze the 
Dutch response to the rise of China.  
Analysis  
The academic debate has shown that rationalist approaches tend to conclude that EU member 
states mainly focus on material and economic interests, not balancing economic and political 
values and interests in the response to China. Constructivists on the other hand indicate that 
member states carefully balance political and economic interests and values in response to 
China. However, as followed from the previous section, rationalist approaches overlook 
internal dynamics of the state and constructivist approaches are limited by their positivist 
research agenda. This section therefore takes a poststructuralist lens to analyze the case of the 
Netherlands. The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 analyzes how economic and political 
interests and values are balanced in the Dutch foreign policy vis-à-vis the rise of China by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Alternatives that are proposed by the AIV, the media and members 
of the Dutch parliament (MPs) are discussed as well. In the second part, it is demonstrated how 
the Dutch state identity and the Chinese state identity are constructed in the discourse. This 
provides reasons for the policy priorities addressed in the discourse. The last part assesses the 
context of the EU in more detail.  
 
Part 1 Striking a balance?  
This part demonstrates that the main priority of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs lies with 
economic interests, the protection of economic security and the protection of the international 
rules-based system. It also demonstrates the Dutch preference to act on the EU level with 
regards to the rise of China. It will also demonstrate that there are competing visions in the 
discourse that deny the necessity to focus mainly on economic interests and economic security. 
These competing visions place greater emphasis on the protection of human rights in the Dutch 
relation with China.  However, these competing visions seem of little concern to the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Economic interests and economic security  
The priority with economic interests and the protection of economic security follows from a 
couple of indicators. First of all,  the structure of the policy memorandum is as following: The 
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first chapter is about sustainable trade and investments and counts ten pages. The second 
chapter is about peace, security and stability and counts eleven pages. The third chapter is called 
“values” and  it only comprises five pages. Without considering the content of these chapters, 
this indicates the priority of trade and security in the China policy memorandum. If one 
compares this to the Joint Communication, it is striking that the order of the ten actions it sets 
out is quite different: The first action covers human rights, the second climate change 
cooperation and the third EU-China cooperation in conflict zones. Only from the fourth action 
point onwards, trade becomes a topic of interest. The final two actions highlight security 
considerations (EU Commission, 2019). Compared to the Dutch policy memorandum, the EU 
appears to prioritize human rights more.   
Diving deeper into the Dutch policy memorandum, it becomes clear that the focus on 
economic interests and economic security reappears through most of the chapters.  Overall, it 
is stressed that Dutch dependence on private enterprises to execute almost all vital processes, 
results in the importance to stay vigilant (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 42).  In the first 
chapter, the main economic interests that are at stake are discussed: these are the attractive size 
of the Chinese export market,7 the Chinese research and development budgets and the countless 
investment opportunities for Dutch enterprises (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 23). In this 
chapter, it is also indicated what economic risks are foreseen; first and foremost, the lack of 
reciprocity (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 23). Other risks that are mentioned are matters such 
as dependence on Chinese raw materials, investment risks, the protection of intellectual 
property and the risk of unwanted technology transference (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, chapter 
II.1) . The second chapter highlights the increased Chinese military potential and the way China 
has become a more assertive and self-assured international player (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, 
p. 35). Of main concern are cyberespionage, unwanted influence and economic security 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 35). In chapters focused on other policy areas, economic 
interests reappear for example by indicating the risk of China’s presence in Africa for Dutch 
enterprises who may be confronted with unfair competition, or by addressing the role of China 
in the world market of fossil fuel (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 63; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019, 
p. 56). It is remarkable that although economic interests are stressed in the policy memorandum 
and by the speeches of the ministers, the in 2014 expressed bilateral ambition for a 
comprehensive and strategic partnership is mentioned only once in the policy documents. 
                                                        
7 Dutch exports to China grew from 1 billion euro in 2001, to well beyond 11 billion euro in 2017 (Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 2019, p. 24)  
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Instead much emphasis is placed on the preference to approach China through the European 
Union level (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; Government, 2019).This 
follows from statements such as: “A realistic China policy obviously requires recognizing that 
the Netherlands on its own doesn’t have much manoeuvring room in relations with China. So, 
it’s fortunate that we’re a member of the European Union” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 4).  
From the above, it follows that the main priority in the Dutch response vis-à-vis the rise 
of China lies with the protection of economic interests and economic security. However, 
political values are not completely overlooked either, as will now be addressed in the next 
section.  
 
Political values  
The Dutch policy response to the rise of China addresses political values in chapter three. The  
importance to protect the international rules-based order is clearly stated in this chapter. The 
strategy on the protection of human rights appears to be less of a vocal point. These conclusions 
can be drawn from the following.  
First of all, although the policy chapter on ‘values’ explicitly states that the protection 
of human rights is a vital part of Dutch foreign policy, it remains a relative short and unclear 
chapter in terms of the actions the Ministry proposes to undertake. For example, it is stated that 
“our worldwide values system” is under pressure and that the Netherlands and China adhere to 
different sets of values (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 47). This makes it look like values, 
including universal human rights are something that can be twisted about. Moreover, it is stated 
that “the Netherlands continue to search for shared values with China” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 
2019b, p. 51). Indicating that the human rights do not necessarily have to be recognized by 
China.   
 Moreover, although it is explicitly mentioned in the chapter that the Dutch government 
has an interest in the protection of human rights it overlooks several aspects of the human rights 
situation in China. The interest in the protection of human rights is explained as “a way to 
ensure a prosperous and stable world” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 49). Yet the chapter 
discusses only one main human rights problem, which is the human rights position of the 
Uighurs in China (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 49). By only focusing on the position of 
Uighurs,  the unfavorable position of other minorities remains undiscussed. It therefore seems 
that the protection of human rights is mainly driven by the interest in a “prosperous and stable 
world”, rather than the wellbeing of persons at risk.   
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 This is different from the way human rights were approached in the 2013 China policy 
memorandum. This policy memorandum is called “Investing in Values and Business.” The title 
already suggests the importance of the protection of values. These values are referred to as: 
“universal values, such as human rights” (Tweede Kamer, 2013, p. 11). The policy itself 
signifies the ambition to profit maximally from the economic opportunities that China has to 
offer, while also explicitly promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights in China 
(Tweede Kamer, 2013).  
The Churchill speech by Rutte further sustains this change. He states that “it goes 
without saying that the EU must always stand up for the values that bind us both in Europe and 
worldwide. But I seriously doubt whether this, on its own, will make the EU as effective and 
influential as it could be, as it wants to be, and as it should be in the future” (Government, 
2019). This shows how there is some doubt about the efficiency of the focus on political values 
alone.  
 Whereas there seems to be an overall smaller emphasis on the protection of human 
rights, the protection of the international rules-based order is strongly emphasized. This follows 
from the repeated ambition to maintain and protect the international rules-based order 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 2; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 47 ; Government, 2019). 
Broadly speaking, the international system based on the rule of law is constantly reminded to 
be “crucial” for Dutch welfare (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 2; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; 
p. 51; Government, 2019). Free trade requires a working international rules-based order 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 19). Rutte even states that “the importance of a rules-based 
multilateral world order is equally self-evident” (Government, 2019). It is argued that 
“everybody benefits from free trade in a system based on law and rules” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 
2019a, p. 2).  
It thus follows that the Dutch government is mainly concerned with the protection of 
economic interests and economic security. Although political values, more specifically the 
protection of human rights are still a part of the policy memorandum, it seems to have become 
less significant if compared to the previous China policy memorandum. The protection of the 
international-rules based order however remains important. Although the title of the 2019 
policy memorandum includes the word ‘balance’ (Netherlands-China: a new balance), the 
Ministry does not immediately refer to a balance of economic interests and political values such 
as human rights.  
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A different balance: Views from MPs and the media  
The policy memorandum is strongly criticized by MPs and the media. Both provide different 
views on how the Dutch policy response should balance economic interests and political values.  
As mentioned earlier, the policy memorandum was intended to be a strategy. It was 
requested  through a motion (Tweede Kamer, 2018). Although the MPs specifically asked for 
a China strategy, the word ‘strategy’ is no longer to be found in the document.  The fact that 
the title and the whole document itself lost the status of a strategy has triggered a number of 
reactions. Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs refers to it as a strategy, acting as if it is still a 
synonym for the policy memorandum (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 1). Yet, in parliament the 
document has been referred to as “a leaflet”8 (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 19), an “empty shell”9 
or a “void policy memorandum”10 (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 22). These comments are made by 
politicians across the political spectrum with the exception of the VVD, a liberal party and the 
main coalition party. The debate was concluded with a parliamentary request to rewrite the 
chapter on human rights (Tweede Kamer, 2019).  Although it is quite common that policy 
papers are criticized in parliament, it is exceptional that a wide majority of the parliamentarians 
asks the Minister responsible to rewrite a chapter of a policy document (De Boer, 2019). 
Minister Blok however repeatedly mentioned in the debate that rewriting a chapter of the policy 
memorandum is “just homework for civil servants” (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 36). Arguably, 
striking a balance between human rights and economic interests is no longer the relevant 
question for the Minister of Foreign Affairs.   
In the media, words such as “a small encyclopedia” (Brouwers, 2019a), “an average 
thesis” (De Boer, 2019b), or a “handy booklet” (Brouwers, 2019a) are used to refer to the policy 
memorandum. The media articles all agree that the memorandum sums up an analysis of the 
situation but that it lacks strategy, the policy remains “elusive” (Brouwers, 2019b). In the media 
it is also suggested that instead of focusing on diminishing the economic dependence on China, 
the government could focus on increasing China’s dependence on the Netherlands. For 
example, by  using the export of agricultural goods or large Dutch companies such as ASML 
that China needs for its production chains (Alonso, 2019). 
The request to rewrite the chapter on human rights indicate that MPs are looking for a 
different kind of balance; a balance in which political values are better protected. MPs make 
this clear by stating for example that the Netherlands, “host of the city of justice and peace,” 
                                                        
8brochure  
9lege huls 
10niksige nota 
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needs to do more to protect human rights of Uighurs, Christians and other Chinese minorities 
(Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 7). Moreover, MPs from all over the political spectrum argue that the 
Dutch government can use its economic weight to be more active in defending human rights in 
China (Tweede Kamer, 2019). Some MPs suggest to impose economic sanctions in order to 
improve the human rights situation in China (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 17). Another member of 
parliament suggests that the Netherlands can use the Dutch agriculture market as a strategic 
partner in the relation with China (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 4). Only the VVD argues that they 
have to “be realistic” and asks the parliament if they really think “China will change anything 
if the Netherlands stops doing trade with China” (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p.4). However, it 
appears that most public voices repeatedly argue that the Netherlands and the EU have the 
economic leverage to demand more from China with regards to their human rights situation 
(Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 24). MPs thus seek more active protection of human rights in the 
relation with China.  
In the parliamentary debate, the Minister of Foreign Affairs repeatedly stresses that the 
Netherlands are leading when it comes to protecting human rights and our “European way of 
life” (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 30). MPs are less convinced that the Netherlands is taking this 
leading role. The majority of the questions asked to the Minister concern the protection of 
human rights (Tweede Kamer, 2019). The MPs raise matters that have remained undiscussed 
in the policy memorandum, such as the protection of human rights in relation to the situation in 
Hong Kong or the unfavorable position of Christians in China (Tweede Kamer, 2019) 
The parliamentary debate indicates that MPs agree with the necessity to team up 
internationally, and preferably at the EU-level. Yet, most parliamentarians have more faith in 
the economic importance of the Netherlands. They are more explicit about the strong position 
of the Netherlands internationally and seem to be less convinced by the idea that the 
Netherlands on its own has so little to say. This becomes clear form the alternatives they 
propose.   
 
Thus far, this section has provided an overview of what is proposed in the discourse. This has 
provided an insight in how there are differences of opinion between the Dutch government and 
public voices when it concerns the foreign policy approach towards China’s rise and the 
different interests and values that need to be balanced in the approach. It also appears that 
whereas the parliament does indeed have an opinion on striking a balance between political 
values and economic interests, the Dutch government seems to be more concerned for economic 
interests and the protection of economic security. The Dutch government appears to be less 
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concerned with the protection of universal human rights. Relating this to the former Dutch 
China policy of 2013, it seems a shift is taking place. 
 
Part 2 Identities constructed in the discourse  
There are a couple of binaries that are found in the discourse that help understand how the 
Netherlands perceives itself and China. From the discourse analysis it follows that the 
Netherlands identity is shaped by, amongst others, its democratic character, its characteristic as 
ideological free-trader and its role as an international and European player. These 
characteristics provide reasons for the prioritization of economic interests and economic 
security interests by the Dutch government. Moreover, it provides a reason for the emphasis to 
act at the EU level in response to the rise of China. It also provides reason for focus on the 
protection of human rights by alternative parties such as the parliament and voices in the media.  
 
Democracy versus autocracy  
Throughout the discourse, emphasis is placed on the values and the political system of the 
Netherlands. The democratic character of the Netherlands is often highlighted. For example,  
directly after the introduction of his speech, Stef Blok, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, states 
that the “Netherlands is a democracy” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a). He accords a couple of 
consequences to that statement, namely that therefore “freedom,” “equality,” “solidarity’” and 
“transparency” are values on which the Dutch society is built (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 48.). Phrases such as “we stand up for human rights,” “the 
government stands for protection of the rule of law, an open economy and society” 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 8), and “ values such as free trade, and an international system 
based on rules are no longer evident” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 19), indicate the 
identification with democracy, transparency, an open economy and human rights. In the 
discourse, it thus becomes apparent that values such as freedom, solidarity and equality translate 
directly to a political system of democracy and the rule of law (MBZ, 2019, p. 48).  
This is set in sharp contrast to the political system of China in which these values are 
said to not be respected (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 4). By emphasizing the democratic 
character of the Netherlands and the EU member states, it is thus also emphasized that China is 
not democratic.  Hence, this touches upon conflicting political systems: that of autocracy and 
democracy (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 13). The different values of these systems are 
highlighted, especially the fact that democracy, freedom and the rule of law have a different 
meaning for China (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 48). From this it follows that the 
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international rules-based system and a concern for human rights are constructed as part of the 
Dutch state identity.  
Moreover, a distinction is also made between the “open” Western model and the 
“closed” Chinese model (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p.  14). The ‘Community of Shared 
Future for Mankind’ proposed by Xi Jinping describes this closed model in which economic 
rights are prevalent, individual rights are less important than collective rights and there is no 
room for international concern for human rights (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 17). The 
identification with human rights indicates concern for the Chinese understanding of human 
rights. The EU Joint Communication and the documents of the Dutch government both 
acknowledge the improvements China has made in terms of socioeconomic rights 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; European Commission, 2019). Yet, 
it is also highlighted that socioeconomic rights are not everything and that civil, and political  
rights need to be upheld as well and that protecting socioeconomic rights is not enough 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a; European Commission, 2019). Moreover, it is argued that the 
‘closed model’ profits from the openness of the Western model (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 
14).In the discourse it is the first time that China is explicitly called a “systemic rival” by both 
the European Commission and the Netherlands governments (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 
70;European Commission, 2019, p.1). This shows how China, because of its different political 
system is approached with more hesitance and vigilance. This provides a reason for the focus 
on economic security.  
 Another dichotomy that can be identified is the distinction made between the European 
and Western “ideological free traders” on the one hand and “profiteers of the system” on the 
other hand (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 29; Tweede Kamer, 2019).Whereas democracy is 
related to the rule of law, China’s political system is related to the absence of the rule of law, 
which makes doing business in China more difficult for Dutch and EU businesses. The 
emphasis of economic openness that is part of this Western model, thus directly relates to the 
problem of access to the Chinese economy. This provides a reason for the constant emphasis 
on the “lack of reciprocity” in Dutch-Sino relations and EU-China relations (Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 2019a; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; Tweede Kamer, 2019). This is emphasized by 
questions such as: “Would China approve if the Netherlands buys a port in China? I don’t think 
so,” (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 14) or phrases such as: “If China can enjoy the free market in 
the Netherlands, then Dutch enterprises should also be protected in China” (Tweede Kamer, 
2019, p. 13). This emphasis on reciprocity is in line with the priority of protecting the 
international rules-based order.  
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The Netherlands also seems to be identified by its characteristic as an international 
player.  The Dutch Prime Minister  for example states in his speech at the University of Zurich 
in which he states: “of course the importance of sticking together is obvious” or “the EU itself 
is the best example of the universal benefits of working together internationally” (Government, 
2019).  The emphasis on the fact that the Netherlands “cannot do it alone” makes it look more 
natural that the Netherlands is “lucky” to be a member of the European Union, or is “naturally 
a member of the European Union” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 4; Buitenlandse Zaken, 
2019b, p. 44). Overall, it can be said that the international and European character of the 
Netherlands is portrayed as a natural part of its identity. From this section, it thus follows that 
the Netherlands is portrayed as a ‘natural’ member of the European Union. It is therefore also 
‘natural’ that the Dutch government transfers most of the proposed actions point to the preferred 
EU-level.  
 
Chinese versus Dutch identity  
From the previous section it thus followed that democracy, adherence to an open-economy, 
human rights and the international character of the Netherlands on the one hand define the 
identity of the Netherlands, but on the other hand also affect the way China is perceived. China 
is also recognized by words such as “assertive” and “active” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a; 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b; European Commission, 2019; Government, 2019; Tweede Kamer, 
2019). This notion of assertiveness and activeness can be traced back to the time that China 
was not as assertive on the international stage, or as the Dutch Prime Minister puts it: “New, 
major players have entered the field. I’m thinking mainly of China of course” (Government, 
2019). China is furthermore portrayed as “big” and “important” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, 
p. 13), as an “essential player” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 56 ), a “key global actor” 
(European Commission, 2019, p. 1), and a “leading technological power” (European 
Commission, 2019, p. 1). It is underlined that the country is “changing rapidly,” or “changing 
in unprecedented speed” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 17; 
European Commission, 2019, p. 1; Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 20).  This provides another reason 
for which the Netherlands government remains more concerned with the economic security 
dimension of the relation. The next section assesses the context of the EU foreign policy in 
more detail.  
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Part 3 EU context  
The identification of the Netherlands as a ‘natural European member state’ and the importance 
attributed to act on the EU level, indicate that the European Union context is crucial to the 
Netherlands foreign policy as proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  It is regarded “as 
lucky” to be a member of the European Union, as the Netherlands is argued to be “simply too 
small” (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019a, p. 4 ; Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, 44). In response to 
questions from MPs as well, the Minister of Foreign Affairs relates most matters to the EU. 
However, it is only rarely addressed that it may be complicated to act on this level, instead 
emphasis is placed on the fact that European cooperation is “necessary” and “crucial” 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 94). 
It is not only argued that EU cooperation is necessary, it is also argued that it should 
include both economic and political aspects. This follows from the emphasis on the fact that in 
China there is no division between the economic and the political: their approach is integrated 
(Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019, p. 31). This means that the Netherlands needs to look out for 
economic activities of China that carry political risk for the Netherlands (AIV, 2019, p. 10; 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 41).  
Dual-use goods are an example of how the economic, political and security dimension 
are no longer separated in the relation to China. Dual-use goods are civil products that can also 
be used for military ends (AIV, 2019). Despite the arms embargo, these kinds of products can 
be exported to China, if in accordance with EU regulation11. This EC regulation outlines which 
dual-use products require a license in order to export the product abroad (AIV, 2019, p. 56). 
The Dutch government acts in line with this regulation and aims to evaluate and update the 
current regulation (Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019b, p. 31). For some MPs this may go too slowly, 
they suggest that the government should update the list of products that require a license 
themselves  (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 49). This example demonstrates that the EU context is 
intrinsically linked to Dutch national foreign policy.  
Yet, it may not be as easy to achieve European cooperation in the economic and political 
policy area. The Dutch Prime Minister touches briefly upon this complexity to achieve 
cooperation at the EU-level, by stating that “The EU should be a political force to be reckoned 
with. In reality we are not, or at least not enough. One of the main problems is that, in many 
cases, member states and the European Institutions are not on the same page” (Government, 
2019). However, the underlying internal difficulties are rarely addressed in the Dutch policy 
                                                        
11 Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009  
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memorandum. What  stands out for example, is the factual way in which the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs approaches these internal differences within the EU. The 17+1 initiative, for example, 
is described as follows: “Via the 17+1 initiative, European countries receive political attention 
from Chinese leaders. European countries hope to gain investments and trade from this.” The 
public fear that this creates a gap between European member states is not mentioned, giving it 
marginal importance (AIV, 2019, p. 30). However, the 17+1 framework might complicate the 
Dutch ambition to act in concert with the EU.  
There are more examples of differences between member states vis-a-vis the relations with 
China that are marginalized in the discourse. The different approaches towards  the Belt and 
Road Initiative, as mentioned in the previous chapter has resulted in division between EU 
member states and the EU and the United States. Yet this is an aspect that is barely touched 
upon in the discourse. The different political meanings concerning what “protecting the 
European way of life” actually means remain barely touched upon. Hungary’s political affairs 
could be interesting in that regards, but this is also not mentioned (AIV, 2019, p. 30). China’s 
increased focus on bilateral relationships, as is demonstrated in the historical overview, is also 
not explicitly addressed in the discourse. Although these bilateral relationships are feared to 
undermine EU cooperation (Chang & Pieke, 2016, p. 45).  
It is remarkable that internal differences that may affect the outcome of EU cooperation 
are not discussed in more detail. Especially as there are already signs that these internal 
differences have influenced the EU’s action on the human rights situation in China. Take for 
example the Chinese investment in the port of Piraeus, in Greece. As part of the Chinese Belt 
and Road Initiative, China bought 51% of the shares in the company; giving it access to one of 
the largest sea ports of the EU (AIV, 2019). It is argued that this investment has not only resulted 
in increased access of China to the EU market, but that it has also had political implications; 
shortly after the investment was made, Greece blocked an EU human rights declaration to the 
UN (Tweede Kamer, 2019, p. 22). Considering the length of the Dutch policy memorandum, it 
is surprising that these internal difficulties remain relatively unaddressed. The result is however, 
that the government’s emphasis on action at the EU level comes across as less challenging in 
the discourse.   
 
Overview  
From the discourse analysis it followed that Dutch foreign policy with regards to the rise of 
China is not simply a balance of economic interests and political values, nor is it solely 
economic benefits that count. In light of the rise of China, the protection of economic interests 
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has become more political, as was illustrated by the example of dual-use goods. The Dutch 
government stresses these developments and argues that the Netherlands should seek to act on 
the EU-level in response to the rise of China.   
 However, internal differences between the EU member states that may complicate EU 
cooperation remain relatively undiscussed.  By simplifying these differences or by excluding 
them from the discourse, the emphasis to act on the EU-level become more natural.  
Moreover, alternatives to focus more on the protection of political values by using either 
the economic power of the Netherlands or of the EU as suggested by members of parliaments 
and media articles are marginalized. The request to step up the game in terms of human rights, 
was considered “homework” to civil servants.  
Conclusion  
This paper has addressed the academic debate how economic and political interests are balanced 
in member states’ foreign policy in response to the rise of China. In the academic debate 
scholars have approached the debate through a rationalist or a constructivist lens. These 
approaches were not sufficient. The rationalist approaches overlook internal state dynamics that 
are necessary to understand international relations, and specifically EU-China relations. The 
constructivist approach includes such internal dynamics into the analysis. Yet, due to the 
positivist research agenda, it remains unclear how the balance in foreign policy is produced and 
what interests and values have become marginalized. Therefore, this paper took a third 
theoretical perspective: poststructuralism. Because poststructuralism is a reflectivist IR 
approach, it offers the possibility to take a different epistemological and methodological 
approach to the debate. This allows to research gaps and marginalized aspects that are 
overlooked by the other theoretical approaches in the debate. To further contribute to the debate, 
this paper looked into the Dutch foreign policy response to the rise of China, a member state 
that had not been looked into in the debate so far.  
 From the discourse analysis it followed that the Dutch government prioritizes economic 
interests, economic security aspects and the protection of the international rules-based order in 
their foreign policy response. There is also a concern for the protection of universal human 
rights, but this is also related to the interest in a prosperous world. This concern for the 
protection of universal human rights seems of less significance compared to the previous Dutch 
China policy. The critical public voices also seem to bear little importance to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.  
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The context of the European Union foreign policy has proven to be quite substantial. 
This is because the EU is the preferred level on which the Dutch government proposes to act in 
response to the rise of China. Internal difficulties are marginalized in the discourse, which 
makes this focus on the EU seem more natural and less complicated.  
The poststructuralist analysis has thus how economic and political interests are balanced 
in the Dutch national foreign policy towards the rise of China, it has further demonstrated which 
aspects are marginalized. Therefore, a reflectivist approach thus provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of how economic and political interests are balanced in the 
foreign policy of EU member states in their response to China.  
A discourse analysis presents a certain truth for a particular moment in time. Further 
research will have to demonstrate whether  the Netherlands will continue to take this approach 
to the rise of China. Especially in light of current global affairs and the governmental elections 
that will take place in the Netherlands in March 2021, new priorities and a new balance in the 
approach to the rise of China might be shaped.  
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